Abstract: With inflation and policy interest rates at historically low levels, policymakers show great concern about "downside tail risks" due to a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. Low probability or tail events, such as sustained deflation or recession, are disruptive for the economy and can be difficult to resolve. This paper shows that price-level targeting mitigates downside tail risks respect to inflation targeting when policy is conducted through a simple interest-rate rule subject to a zero lower bound. Thus, price-level targeting is a more effective policy framework than inflation targeting for the management of downside tail risks in a low-inflation economy. At the same time, the average performance of the economy is not very different if policy implements price-level targeting instead of inflation targeting through a simple interest-rate rule. Price-level targeting may imply less variability of inflation than inflation targeting because policymakers can shape private-sector expectations about future inflation more effectively by targeting directly the price level path rather than inflation.
Introduction
The public, policymakers, and economists agree that a return to the high rates of in ‡ation experienced in the 1970s and 1980s must be avoided because high in ‡ation is detrimental to the economic well-being of the public. 1 As a result, central banks have adopted policies to keep in ‡ation low in recent decades.
The Federal Reserve's preferred measure of in ‡ation is the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) price index. This paper shows that in a small New-Keynesian sticky-price model, private-sector consumption is as much as 0.5 percentage point higher if PCE-price in ‡ation in the long run is 1.5 percent per year rather than 3.5 percent per year. 2 Thus, the Federal Reserve must keep in ‡ation low because reverting back to moderate or high rates of in ‡ation would hamper the economic well-being of the public over the long run.
When in ‡ation is low and expected to remain low, then nominal interest rates tend to be low. But nominal interest rates cannot fall below zero under normal circumstances. 3 Since central banks counteract slowing economic activity by lowering short-term interest rates, the extent to which policymakers can respond to an economic slowdown is limited in a low-in ‡ation economy. Once short-term nominal interest rates fall to zero, conventional monetary policy tools no longer work to stimulate economic activity. As a consequence, downside risks to the economy, such as de ‡ation or recession, are greater when in ‡ation is low.
With in ‡ation and policy interest rates at historically low levels, policymakers show concern about downside risks due to a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. Policymakers are particularly concerned about downside tail risks, such as sustained de ‡ation or recession, which are disruptive for the economy and can be di¢ cult to resolve. Moreover, models are typically better approximations of how the economy functions on average rather than in extreme circumstances. As a result, policymakers have an incentive to embrace 'risk management' and make economic decisions that are robust to the occurrence of low probability catastrophes or tail risks.
The economics literature provides policymakers intuition about the e¤ectiveness of some monetary 1 See Fischer (1996) for a discussion of the costs of in ‡ation. 2 Available measures of in ‡ation tend to be biased upward. As former Federal Reserve Governor Gramlich (2003) discusses, recent estimates place the measurement bias in the PCE price index at about 0.5 percentage point per year. Such bias has to be added to the model-based in ‡ation rate to obtain an actual, measured in ‡ation rate. 3 In theory, achieving negative nominal interest rates is feasible by levying a tax on money holdings or giving up free convertibility of …nancial assets into cash- Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2003) , and Goodfriend (2000) discuss this idea. PCE-price in ‡ation in the long run is 1.5 percent per year under each policy framework. The simple policy rules change the nominal interest rate subject to a zero lower bound in response to in ‡ation deviations from the in ‡ation target, or price-level deviations from the target path, but not output deviations. This paper shows the e¤ectiveness of price-level targeting, as an alternative to in ‡ation targeting, for the management of downside tail risks in a small New-Keynesian sticky-price model when policy is conducted through a simple interest-rate rule subject to a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.
The performance of the economy under simple policy rules, which implement price-level targeting or in ‡ation targeting, is compared to the welfare-maximizing performance that would be achieved under time-zero optimal policy subject to a zero lower bound. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, then Section 3 explains the equilibrium de…nition. In Section 4, the model is calibrated to recent U.S. data. Section 5 shows that moderate in ‡ation imparts substantial costs respect to low in ‡ation. Sections 6 and 7
show that price-level targeting is a more e¤ective policy framework than in ‡ation targeting for the management of tail risks of de ‡ation or recession. Section 8 shows the robustness of the …ndings to a wide range of calibrations, and Section 9 brie ‡y concludes.
4 Also the output gap in the long run has a longer and fatter left tail when policy is conducted through a simple in ‡ation-targeting rule that prescribes an aggressive response to output deviations from an output target. 5 The approximated welfare-theoretic objective function in the small New-Keynesian model is quadratic in deviations of in ‡ation from zero and deviations of output from the socially e¢ cient level. The level of welfare is not very di¤erent if policy is conducted through a simple price-level-targeting rule or a simple in ‡ation-targeting rule, because the variability of in ‡ation and the variability of the output gap are not very di¤erent if policy implements price-level-targeting or in ‡ation-targeting through a simple rule.
Model
The setting adopts the well-known sticky-price version of the small New-Keynesian model, which is discussed in-depth by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) , Woodford (2003a) , Galí (2008) , and others. 6
Private Sector
The private sector consists of a representative consumer and …rms in monopolistic competition facing restrictions on the frequency of price adjustments à la Calvo (1983) . Thus, the behavior of the private sector is described by
(1)
where E t denotes the rational expectations operator conditional on all information available at time t. t is the in ‡ation rate, and x t is the output gap or the deviation of output from its ‡exible-price equilibrium. 7 Monetary policy controls the nominal interest rate i t . 8
Equation (1) is a log-linear approximation to the aggregate-supply relation, which describes the optimal price-setting behavior of …rms under staggered price setting. The slope parameter
is a function of the structure of the model economy. 2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor. > 1 is the price elasticity of demand substitution among di¤erentiated goods produced by …rms operating in monopolistic competition. ! > 0 is the elasticity of a …rm's real marginal cost with respect to its own 6 To save space, the complete derivation of the small New-Keynesian model is not shown here. 7 Output is e¢ cient at its deterministic steady state level due to an output subsidy that neutralizes the distortions from monopolistic competition.
8 By abstracting from money-demand distortions associated with positive nominal interest rates, the model can be interpreted as the 'cashless limit'of a model with money holdings. output level. Each period, a share 2 (0; 1) of randomly picked …rms cannot adjust their prices and the remaining (1 ) …rms get to choose prices optimally. The shifter of the aggregate-supply curve, u t , is interpreted as a 'mark-up'shock or the variation over time in the degree of monopolistic competition between …rms.
Equation (2) Equations (3) and (4) describe the evolution of the exogenous mark-up shock (u t ) and the real-rate shock (r n t ). The shocks follow AR(1) stochastic processes with autoregressive coe¢ cients j 2 ( 1; 1)
for j = u; r. The deterministic steady state of the real interest rate is r ss 1= 1, such that r ss 2 (0; +1). The innovations ( "j " jt for j = u; r) are independent both across time and cross-sectionally, and normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviations "j 0 for j = u; r.
Policy
Mainly for reasons of analytical tractability, the economics literature typically studies policies which do not rule out negative nominal interest rates. 10 This paper, instead, contrasts the performance of two policy rules within the family of implementable, simple interest-rate rules. The rules are implementable because policy ensures the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is never violated (i t 0 for all t and each state of the economy). The rules are simple because policy responds to readily observable macroeconomic variables rather than the shocks bu¤eting the economy.
Simple In ‡ation-Targeting Rule. Under the …rst policy rule, when the zero lower bound is not binding (i t > 0) the change in the nominal interest rate responds to deviations of in ‡ation from an in ‡ation target and deviations of output from an output target x according to
where t p t p t 1 and p t is the price level in period t. The output target is the steady-state value 9 The real-rate shock summarizes all shocks that under ‡exible prices generate variation in the real interest rate; it captures the combined e¤ects of preference shocks, productivity shocks, and exogenous changes in government expenditure.
1 0 See for example Woodford (2003a) or Galí (2008) , and references therein.
of output consistent with the in ‡ation target, where x
(1 ) 1 solves equation (1) in steady state, so that the change in the nominal interest rate is on average equal to zero in an equilibrium in which the in ‡ation target is achieved on average.
Simple Price-Level-Targeting Rule. The second policy rule is given by
where the change in the nominal interest rate responds to deviations of output from an output target
x as before, but responds also to deviations of the price level p t from a target path for the price level f p t g, which grows deterministically at a rate .
The simple targeting rules (6) and (7) are '…rst-di¤erence' interest-rate rules since they set the change in the nominal interest rate from its past level. In contrast, 'partial-adjustment' interest-rate rules set the current level of the nominal interest rate putting less or no weight on its past level. 11
Why policymakers should employ a …rst-di¤erence rule rather than a partial-adjustment rule? Under a …rst-di¤erence interest-rate rule, the policymaker does not need to know the equilibrium value of the interest rate, since the change in the nominal interest rate is zero when price changes are at the target rate in equilibrium. Thus, policy is less di¢ cult to implement or communicate to the public with a …rst-di¤erence rule because policy requires less information about the economy. 12 Woodford (2003a) explains the properties of the simple targeting rules (6) and (7) in the theoretical case where nominal interest rates are allowed to be negative. When the policymaker uses an interest-rate rule of the form (6), but in addition can set nominal interest rates to negative values, then equilibrium is determinate if and only if the policy response coe¢ cients satisfy > (1 ) 1 x . When the policymaker uses instead a rule of the form (7), but can set negative nominal interest rates, then equilibrium is necessarily determinate if the policy response coe¢ cients satisfy p > 0 and x 0.
1 1 With partial-adjustment of the nominal interest rate from its past level, the simple in ‡ation-targeting rule (6) for instance has the more general representation it = max [0; (
is the equilibrium value of the nominal interest rate. However, { is irrelevant for the simple targeting rules studied in this paper since i = 1.
1 2 In addition, numerical simulations show that the policymaker can sustain a level of private-sector consumption that is closer to the fully optimal level, achieved under time-zero optimal policy, if the policymaker uses a …rst-di¤erence rule rather than a partial-adjustment rule. Intuitively, more dependence of current policy actions on past policy allows the policymaker to steer private-sector expectations of future policy more e¤ectively. Woodford's (2003b) argument that policymakers should embrace interest-rate smoothing to mimic optimal policy is even stronger when the policy interest rate approaches the zero lower bound.
By not taking into account the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, the rational-expectations equilibrium in the small New-Keynesian model is necessarily determinate regardless of how small the policy response by the policymaker if policy responds to price deviations from target ( > 0 or p > 0), but not output deviations ( x = 0). Intuitively, no matter how small the policy response may be, a sustained increase in in ‡ation in excess of the target eventually results in the nominal interest rate being permanently raised by more than the amount of the excess in ‡ation. In other words, the Taylor principle is satis…ed by any such rule regardless of the strength of the policy response.
Once the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is correctly taken into account, however, the policymaker cannot respond too aggressively to price deviations from target to ensure determinacy of equilibrium. Intuitively, monetary policy cannot stabilize the economy if nominal interest rates are excessively variable and thereby the zero lower bound is encountered too frequently. Thus, the policy response coe¢ cients have an upper bound, j (0; +1) for j = ; p; x, beyond which interest-rate policy cannot ensure determinacy of equilibrium. 13 The small New-Keynesian model is developed from explicit micro-foundations. As a result, a welfaretheoretic objective function can be derived by taking a second-order Taylor series approximation to the expected life-time utility of the consumer. Woodford (2003a) shows that the resulting objective function is quadratic in deviations of output from the socially e¢ cient level and deviations of in ‡ation from zero.
Thus, the policymaker could chose the response coe¢ cients of the simple policy rules to maximize welfare for the representative consumer.
In the case of 'optimal' simple policy rules, the optimal policy response coe¢ cients, op or op p , maximize the welfare-theoretic objective function
subject to the model equations (1)- (4) and the policy rule (6) or (7), where the weight assigned to the goal of output stability, relative to price stability,
is a function of the structure of the model economy.
Equilibrium
Equations (1), (2) and (6) or (7) form a nonlinear system of three equations with three unknowns, which must be satis…ed by policy in equilibrium. Solving the system delivers a three-dimensional nonlinear equilibrium response function
over a four-dimensional state space
wherep t 1 is the deviation of the price level from its target path in period t 1 (p t 1 p t 1 p t 1 ).
When the policymaker uses the simple price-level-targeting rule (7), it needs to know the price level in period t 1 to conduct policy in period t. When the policymaker uses the simple in ‡ation-targeting rule (6), however,p t 1 is not a state variable of the policy problem because the price level is irrelevant for the equilibrium of the economy under a policy regime of in ‡ation targeting.
The state in period t + 1 depends on the state and equilibrium response in period t and the shock innovations that are unknown in period t,
Associated with the equilibrium response function, the expectations function is
where f ( ) is the probability density function of the shock innovations, " t (" ut ; " rt ) 2 R 2 . 14 The 1 4 When agents have 'perfect foresight'( "j ! 0 for j = u; r), however, the state in period t + 1 is completely described by the state and equilibrium response in period t, st+1 = g(st; y (st)). Since agents can anticipate future variables with certainty, the expectations function (11) is not integrated over the probability density function of the shock innovations, Etyt+1 (st) = y (g(st; y (st))). following de…nition of a stochastic rational expectations equilibrium is proposed.
De…nition 1 (SREE) Assume "j 0 for j = u; r. A 'stochastic rational expectations equilibrium' of the model is a nonlinear response function y (s t ), over the state s t with law of motion (10), such that the nonlinear system of equilibrium conditions (1), (2) and (6) or (7) is satis…ed.
Importantly, the nonlinear system in De…nition 1 does not have a closed-form solution. A numerical procedure must be used to …nd a …xed-point in the space of nonlinear response functions. Since the number of state variables is unusually high for a model with an occasionally-binding constraint on policy, the algorithm must be highly e¢ cient. Billi (2007) explains the numerical procedure.
Calibration
The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy and the time period is one quarter. Table 2 summarizes the baseline parameter values, which are expressed in quarters unless otherwise noted. The values for the main structural parameters ('; ; ; !; and the resulting ; ) are taken from tables 5.1 and 6.1 of Woodford (2003a) .
The parameters describing the shock processes (r ss ; "r ; r ; and "u ; u ) are estimated over the period 1983:1 2007:4, with the same approach of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Adam and Billi (2006) . 15 The predictions of an unconstrained VAR in in ‡ation, the output gap, and the nominal interest rate are used to construct the expectations of in ‡ation and the output gap. 16 These estimated expectations and the actual data are then plugged into equations (1) and (2). The equation residuals identify the historical shock processes u t and r n t . Fitting AR(1) processes to the historical shocks justi…es the shock processes in table 2.
The quarterly subjective discount factor is = (1 + r ss ) 1 4 0.9926, as implied by the estimate for the deterministic steady state of the real interest rate r ss = 3.0 percent per year.
In line with the …ndings of Billi (2007) 
Why Low
In ‡ation? Figure 1 shows the representative consumer's welfare using the baseline calibration in table 2 under the di¤erent simple policy rules. Accordingly, the policymaker uses a simple policy rule that responds to price deviations from target ( > 0 or p > 0), but not output deviations ( x = 0). The representative consumer's welfare is measured in terms of its permanent consumption loss due to business cycle ‡uctu-ations, which is derived via a transformation of the unconditional loss in the welfare-theoretic objective function (8). 17 Appendix A.1 explains the computation of the permanent consumption loss.
[ Figure 1 about here] 1 5 Adam and Billi (2006) estimate the historical shocks over the shorter period 1983:1 2002:4. The steady state real interest rate is lower and the mark-up shock is more variable, and thereby the e¤ects of the zero lower bound are more severe, when the historical shocks are estimated over the longer period 1983:1 2007:4. 1 6 In ‡ation is measured as the continuously compounded rate of change in the GDP Chain-type Price Index, from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The output gap is measured as the di¤erence between Real GDP, from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and Real Potential GDP, from the Congressional Budget O¢ ce. The nominal interest rate is measured as the average e¤ective federal funds rate, from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
1 7 The unconditional loss is computed as the average discounted loss across 10 4 stochastic simulations, each 10 3 periods long after discarding several pre-simulated periods in order to ascertain that the distribution did reach its stationary con…guration prior to the computation of the loss. when in ‡ation measurement bias is not considered.
Although moderate in ‡ation is costly, in ‡ation can be too low. When the policymaker aims for low in ‡ation, a policy response that is stronger than optimal is more likely to be excessive for the determination of equilibrium. Excessive easing of policy causes too frequent encounters of the policy interest rate with the zero lower bound thus monetary policy fails to stabilize the economy. If the policymaker aims at zero in ‡ation correctly measured (line with crosses in the top-left panel of …gure 1), then = 1:5 is the strongest policy response for which the numerical algorithm can identify an equilibrium.
As a point of comparison, the fully optimal equilibrium is attainable in theory if the policymaker implements time-zero optimal policy. The bottom-left panel of …gure 1 compares welfare under a simple IT rule (solid line with circles) and the time-zero optimal policy (dotted line with triangles). 18 When the in ‡ation target is 1.0 percent per year, if in ‡ation measurement bias is not considered, a simple IT rule prescribing a one-to-one change in the nominal interest rate attains a level of permanent consumption roughly 0:04 percentage point less than time-zero optimal policy. Thus, an optimal simple IT rule attains a level of welfare for the representative consumer that is close to fully optimal.
The right-hand panel of …gure 1 shows the permanent consumption loss if the policymaker follows a simple price-level-targeting (PLT) rule. The permanent consumption loss is a function of the intensity of the policy response to price-level deviations from the target path. For a range of in ‡ation targets, it is optimal for the policymaker to change the nominal interest rate 0.4-to-1 in response to deviations of 1 8 Billi (2007) explains the solution of the time-zero optimal policy problem. The policymaker selects the equilibrium paths of in ‡ation, the output gap, and the nominal interest rate f t; xt; itg 1 t=0 to maximize E0 P 1 t=0 t ( t ) 2 + x the price level from the target path. The various lines appear rather ‡at, but they all peak at p = 0:4.
At the same time, moderate in ‡ation entails substantial costs on consumers when compared to low in ‡ation, similarly to the case of the policymaker using a simple IT rule.
In contrast to the case of the simple IT rule, however, a simple PLT rule with a stronger-than- The bottom panel of …gure 3 shows the long-run stationary distribution of in ‡ation when the policymaker uses a simple policy rule with a response to price deviations that is more aggressive than optimal ( = 2:5 or p = 1). Compared to an optimal simple rule, the long-run stationary distribution of in ‡a-tion has a longer left tail (skewness is 0:3) and fatter tails (kurtosis is 3:8) than a normal distribution if the policymaker reacts too aggressively to in ‡ation based on a simple IT rule. 21 The variability of 1 9 The distribution is computed by assembling 10 5 stochastic simulations at a speci…c time period. The simulations are initialized to the deterministic steady state of the model. By tracking the time-evolution of the mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis, it is ascertained that the distribution did reach its long-run stationary con…guration.
2 0 The zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate is the only nonlinearity in the model. In a linearized model the endogenous variables inherit the properties of the exogenous shock processes. The mark-up shock and real-rate shock are normally distributed. Thus, also the in ‡ation rate and the output gap are normally distributed if the nominal interest rate does not hit the zero lower bound too frequently.in ‡ation is not very di¤erent if the policymaker uses the aggressive simple PLT rule or the aggressive simple IT rule. At the same time, the long-run stationary distribution of in ‡ation remains symmetric and normally distributed when the policymaker uses an aggressive simple PLT rule. Thus, price-level targeting protects the economy against the tail risk of de ‡ation respect to in ‡ation targeting. [ Figure 4 about here] Figure 4 shows also that the variability of the output gap (middle panel) is not very di¤erent if the policymaker uses the simple PLT rule or the simple IT rule. However, responding strongly to output deviations from target reduces signi…cantly the variability of the output gap. At the same time, the improvement in terms of greater stability of the output of the economy is traded o¤ with higher variability of the nominal interest rate. Thus, responding strongly to output deviations from target ultimately makes policy less ‡exible and leads to a higher likelihood of the nominal interest rate hitting the zero lower bound (bottom panel).
[ Figure 5 about here]
The top panel of …gure 5 shows that the long-run stationary distribution of the output gap is symmetric and normally distributed if the policymaker uses a simple policy rule that responds optimally to price deviations from target ( = 1 or p = 0:4) and has a muted response to output deviations from target ( x = 0:2). The bottom panel shows the long-run stationary distribution of the output gap if the policymaker uses a simple policy rule that instead has a stronger-than-optimal responses to output deviations from target ( x = 0:6). The variability of the output gap is not very di¤erent if the policymaker uses a simple PLT rule or a simple IT rule. When the policymaker uses a simple IT rule, the long-run stationary distribution of the output gap has a longer left tail (skewness is 0:5) and fatter tails (kurtosis is 6:9) than a normal distribution. When the policymaker uses a simple PLT rule, however, the long-run stationary distribution of the output gap is closer to normal (skewness is 0:4 and kurtosis is 6:2). Thus, price-level targeting protects the economy against the tail risk of recession respect to in ‡ation targeting.
8 Robustness of Price-Level Targeting   Table 3 compares the …ndings for the baseline level of uncertainty to alternative scenarios of greater uncertainty about the future state of the economy. When the policymaker sets the policy interest rate using an aggressive simple IT rule, the long-run stationary distribution of in ‡ation has skewness 0:3 for the baseline, 0:4 if the mark-up shock is 20 percent more variable than the baseline, and 0:9 if instead the real-rate shock is 20 percent more variable than the baseline. The skewness rises to as much as 1:2 for the scenario of both type of shocks 20 percent more variable than the baseline. At the same time, the kurtosis rises to 3:8 when both type of shocks are 20 percent more variable than the baseline.
Thus, the more variable the shocks bu¤eting the economy the longer the left tail (negative skewness) and the fatter the tails (higher kurtosis) of the long-run stationary distribution of in ‡ation, since the risk of the nominal interest rate hitting the zero lower bound is greater. Thus, a simple PLT rule protects the economy against the tail risk of de ‡ation respect to a simple IT rule, even more so when there is greater uncertainty about the future state of the economy and thereby the risk of the nominal interest rate hitting the zero lower bound is greater. Moreover, the variability of in ‡ation and the variability of the output gap are not very di¤erent if the policymaker uses an aggressive simple IT rule or an aggressive simple PLT rule. As a result, the cost of protection against tail risks (di¤erence in loss between the two policy regimes) is not large, since it is roughly 0:01 percentage point of permanent consumption. Table 4 shows the results for a wide range of changes to each structural parameter of the model.
The alternative calibrations include low or high real-rate elasticity of output (' = 1 or 10), more or less ‡exible prices ( = 0:56 or 0:76), as well as low or high competition among …rms ( = 3 or 15). In all the alternative calibrations investigated, the long-run stationary distribution of in ‡ation has a longer left tail (more negative skewness) and fatter tails (higher kurtosis) than a normal distribution when the policymaker sets the policy interest rate using an aggressive simple IT rule. Table 4 shows also that for the alternative calibrations the long-run stationary distribution of in‡ation does not have a longer left tail (there is no skewness) and the tails are not fatter (kurtosis is not higher) than a normal distribution when the policymaker sets the policy interest rate using an aggressive simple PLT rule rather than an aggressive simple IT rule. The variability of in ‡ation and the variability of the output gap are not very di¤erent if the policymaker uses an aggressive simple IT rule or an aggressive simple PLT rule. As a result, the cost of protection against tail risks (di¤erence in loss between the two policy regimes) is not large. Among the alternative calibrations investigated, the cost of protection against tail risks is largest when prices are less ‡exible than the baseline, but still 
Conclusions
The economics literature suggests that price-level targeting is a potential solution to downside risks in a low-in ‡ation economy due to the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, such as de ‡ation or recession. Since the private sector anticipates that a central bank with a price-level target will undo any price changes, a central bank is more e¤ective at shaping private-sector expectations if it targets the price level path rather than in ‡ation.
This paper shows that price-level targeting is a solution to downside tail risks, such as sustained de ‡ation or recession, when policy is conducted through a simple interest-rate rule subject to a zero lower bound. At the same time, the average performance of the economy is not very di¤erent if policy implements price-level targeting instead of in ‡ation targeting. Price-level targeting may imply less variability of in ‡ation than in ‡ation targeting, since policymakers can shape private-sector expectations about future in ‡ation more e¤ectively by targeting directly the price level path rather than in ‡ation.
A few caveats must be kept in mind in interpreting the …ndings. The model focuses on the e¤ects of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and ignores other reasons for which policymakers show concern about downside risks to the economy. These other reasons include downward wage rigidity, as argued by Tobin (1972) , and debt-de ‡ation, as argued by Fisher (1933) . Thus, price-level targeting may o¤er even greater protection against downside tail risks in a low-in ‡ation economy than is shown in this paper.
A Appendix

A.1 Permanent Consumption Loss
The expected life-time utility of the representative consumer, as shown in Chapter 6 of Woodford (2003a), is validly approximated by
where C is steady state consumption, U c > 0 is steady state marginal utility of consumption and
is the welfare-theoretic objective function (8) which the policymaker maximizes.
At the same time, the utility loss from a permanent consumption loss 0 is
Equating the right-hand sides of (12) and (13), then the permanent consumption loss is 
